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Abstract 
Recent changes in federal and state laws governing non-profit charitable organizations 
are transforming the rules under which they operate and the methods by which they and 
their fiduciaries are held accountable to government and the public. These changes 
include relaxing the rules prohibiting donors from bringing legal suits to enforce the 
terms of their gift or agreeing to modify restrictions; liberalizing the doctrines of cy pres 
and deviation under which charitable purposes and methods for administering them may 
be revised due to changed circumstances; imposing new duties on directors of charitable 
corporations and redefining the scope of their duties of loyalty and care. The Pension 
Reform Act of 2006 changed some of the IRC provisions dealing with charities and 
others are being considered in the Congress. Recommendations to increase federal and 
state regulation are also being considered together with proposals for expanding the 
breadth of self-regulation. The paper describes these changes and their proponents. It 
concludes with observations on their efficacy and the likelihood of their being adopted.  
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Charity law is in a state of flux: the basic rules, many with roots in earliest common law, 
are being reconsidered and revised by legislators, scholars and practitioners. Among 
these are rules prohibiting donors from bringing legal suits to enforce the terms of their 
gifts; laws limiting the ability of donors to agree with charitable donees to modify the 
terms of their gifts; the doctrines of cy pres and deviation under which charitable 
purposes and methods for administering them may be altered due to changed 
circumstances; the statutory provisions imposing on all directors of charitable 
corporations a duty to participate in the affairs of the corporation; and the rules setting 
forth the extent to which charitable fiduciaries can be held liable for breach of their duties 
of loyalty and care.  
 
In the realm of enforcement of these rules, Congress has been asked to consider measures 
to enhance the existing regulatory scheme which relies on the Internal Revenue Code to 
define the duties and obligations of charitable fiduciaries and looks to the Internal 
Revenue Service as the agency to enforce these obligations. At the same time, some 
scholars are suggesting that all regulation be removed from the IRS or that some of its 
powers be transferred to an agency more suited to regulate tax exempt entities than an 
agency whose principal focus is tax collection.  
 
This paper contains a survey of the most recently adopted changes and pending proposals 
for change in both state and federal law applicable to nonprofit charitable organizations, 
focusing on developments in substantive state laws expanding the rights of donors and 
the doctrines of cy pres and deviation. It also describes amendments to the Internal 
Revenue Code enacted in August 2006 and others proposed by the Staff of the Senate 
Finance Committee and by the Joint Committee on Taxation since 2004 that remain 
under consideration in the Congress, together with responses to them from the nonprofit 
community and interested scholars and practitioners.1  
 
 
1 The term “charities” as used herein refers to organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code that are eligible to receive contributions that are deductible by their donors for federal tax 
purposes. In some instances it also includes organizations exempt from tax by virtue of being described in 
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******************* 
Current law grants privileges to charitable nonprofit organizations; of these, tax 
exemption is foremost, but they also include unlimited life, the ability to accumulate 
income, and protection to fiduciaries from suits by unhappy or unruly donors, as well as 
by members of the general public. Substantive laws in the individual states define 
charitable purposes, govern the creation and dissolution of charities, and set forth the 
duties and powers of their fiduciaries; the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code mirror 
these state rules - some impose more stringent limitations while others are more lenient.  
 
Enforcement of state laws is the unique province of the attorneys general who have 
traditionally had exclusive jurisdiction to bring wrong doing to the attention of state 
courts, with the courts empowered to apply a wide range of sanctions to assure 
compliance with the rules and remedy violations. In contrast, as noted, enforcement of 
the federal laws is in the hands of the Internal Revenue Service, which has the power to 
revoke exemption, and apply financial sanctions in the form of excise taxes, as well as 
unique standing to pursue actions in the federal courts, including the Tax Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Thus, one must consider two levels of governments – each with 
differing interests and goals – and one must also consider the advantages of uniformity, 
lest compliance becomes an impossible burden or disparate rules create such confusion 
that enforcement becomes near impossible.2  
 
STATE LAW: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS 
 
State laws governing the organization and operation of charitable nonprofit organizations 
are to be found in the statutes enabling creation of charitable corporations and trusts, 
including statutes and case law defining accepted charitable purposes for which they may 
 
Code section 501(c)(4), many of which are considered charities under state laws. The remaining universe of 
nonprofit organizations described in section 501 are not subject to the constraints under either federal or 
state law described herein, nor are they the focus of current interest in reform.  
 
2 Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004, contains detailed descriptions of the history of charity, 
existing laws and enforcement regimes referred to herein together with proposals for reform. 
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be created; statutes and case law describing the powers, duties and liabilities of 
fiduciaries in regard to the administration of these entities; and statutes and cases 
governing the dissolution or merger of charitable organizations that in all instances direct 
the application of their assets to other charitable entities or when circumstances require 
permit modification of their purposes or methods of administration so that they may 
continue to provide contemporaneous benefit to the general public.  
 
The major recent changes in state laws that have been enacted or are being considered 
involve statutes governing creation and administration of charities; rights of donors; the 
doctrines of cy pres and deviation that the courts apply when there are changed 
circumstances; and the duties and extent of liabilities of trustees and directors in cases of 
breach. There has been far less interest in increasing regulation of charities in the states, 
although proposals to enhance the power of the attorney general have been considered in 
a few states together with provisions that would impose limits on charities similar to 
those in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to publicly traded companies.  
 
The Proponents of Change 
 
The leading proponents of change in state charity laws, in addition to individual 
legislators and members of the executive branch, notably the attorneys general, are the 
American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, and the American Bar Association acting through committees of its various 
Sections. Since 1990 each of these groups has been considering major reforms of certain 
aspects of the laws governing charities. A number of their proposals have been adopted in 
various states, while others are still being refined. In addition the attorneys general in 
California, New York, Massachusetts and Texas had introduced bills designed to improve 
regulation. As of January 1, 2007, only the California bill had been adopted.  
 
The first of the recent changes in state laws governing the administration of charities was 
the adoption in 1992 of a new “Prudent Investor Rule” as part of the Restatement (Third) 
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of Trusts, section 227.3 It incorporated the principles of modern investment theory and 
made obsolete old concepts of trust investment that in many jurisdictions severely 
restricted the ability of fiduciaries to make wise investments. The Rule is intended to 
apply to charitable and private trusts as well as charitable corporations and is now in 
force in 36 states.4 Additional changes to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, adopted in 
2001 and 2003, enlarged the definitions of specific categories of charitable purposes in 
earlier versions and liberalized the doctrine of cy pres. 
 
In 2000 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the 
Uniform Trust Code, subsequently amending it in 2001 and 2003. As of January 1, 2007 
it had been adopted in 19 states. Section 413 contains a new formulation of the doctrine 
of cy pres that follows Restatement (Third)5 but, in a radical change from prior law, 
section 405 grants standing to donors to enforce the terms of their charitable gifts.6  
  
In 2002 the Commissioners constituted a study committee to consider amendments to the 
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, first promulgated in 1972 and as of 
January 1, 2007, in force in 48 states.7 This Act governs investment and management of 
endowment and other restricted fund and was not in conformity with the principles in the 
Modern Prudent Investor Act. Proposed revisions were considered by the Commissioners 
at their annual meetings in 2004 and 2005 and it was adopted in July 2006. Revisions to 
the original act dealing with donor intent and donors’ powers and cy pres are described 
below.   
 
The major recent impetus for change in nonprofit law is the inauguration by the 
American Law Institute in 2001 of a project to define Principles of Nonprofit Law that 
 
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS:  PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).   
4 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT and corresponding state statutes, available at:  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#pruin. 
5 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §413 cmt. (2006).  
6 Id. at §405 cmt.(2006). 
7 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (1972). 
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will parallel its Principles of Corporate Governance for business corporations adopted in 
1992. Following its established procedures, the ALI formed a Committee of Advisors and 
a Members Consultative Group and appointed Professor Evelyn Brody of Chicago-Kent 
School of Law as Reporter. Preliminary drafts were published in subsequent years, and 
the membership reviewed provisions relating to governance.  In September, the ALI 
Council reviewed a revised draft that reflected the May discussions.8 These provisions 
are described below. 
  
In February 2006, a Task Force to Revise the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 
constituted by the Committee on Nonprofit Corporations of the Section on Business Law 
of the American Bar Association, circulated an exposure draft of the “Proposed Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition.” A Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was first 
published in 1952. It was subsequently amended in 1987 and is referred to as the Revised 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.9  
 
In the summer of 2006, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were asked to 
consider revisions to the Uniform Act for the Supervision of Charitable Trusts, adopted in 
1954.10 This Act, which mandated registration and annual reporting by charities to the 
attorney general and enhanced his regulatory powers, formed the basis for statutes now in 
effect, but with major substantive changes, in California, Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, and 
New York.11 There has been little interest in its adoption by other states since the mid-
1960s and proponents of revision argued that it should be revised to reflect changes 
required since its adoption or whether it should be repealed.  
 
Proposals to Modify Laws Relating to Governance  
 
8 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (Council Draft No. 4, 2006). 
9 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT (RMNCA) (1987).   
10 UNIFORM ACT FOR THE SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS (1954). 
11 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 311-17 (The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press 2004).   
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Mandating audits and Audit Committees: In the wake of enactment by Congress in 2002 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed new obligations on publicly traded business 
corporations, a number of states considered extending some of its provisions to charities, 
most notably those mandating financial audits, audit committees comprised of 
independent directors, and certification of financial reports by CEOs and CFOs.12  
Although there appeared to be general interest in the initiative, only California adopted 
the proposed changes.  This California Act, adopted in 2004, added an audit requirement 
for charities with gross receipts of $2 million or more and mandated that they create audit 
committees.13 The original bill, submitted by the attorney general had a $1 million 
threshold, but after protest from some parts of the nonprofit sector, it was raised before 
final passage.14  
 
In 2004, the New York attorney general submitted a number of bills to the legislature 
designed to clarify his enforcement powers and “help prevent financial frauds from 
occurring within not-for-profit corporations.”15 In their original form, audits and audit 
committees would have been mandatory for charities with annual revenue and support of 
$1 million or more.16 This provision was subsequently modified to encourage, but not 
require, boards to designate audit committees, while specifying its duties if one were to 
be established, mandating that the members be independent and prohibiting self 
dealing.17 However, only one of the bills submitted by the attorney general was passed in 
2006: it clarified procedures for dissolution of charities.18 A bill introduced in Texas in 
2005 was similar to the New York proposal, requiring audits for corporations with gross 
 
12 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).   
13 Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2004). 
14 See Cal. Assemb. on Judiciary, Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1262 Assemb. (West June 22, 2004); S. Judiciary 
Comm., Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1262 Assemb. (West April 20, 2004).   
15N.Y. Attorney General’s Legislative Program Bill, #68-05, available at:  
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char_pdf/ag68-05.pdf. 
16 N.Y. S. Bill 4836-A (g)(1) (Apr., 23, 2003).  
17 N.Y. Attorney General’s Legislative Program Bill, #68-05, available at:  
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char_pdf/ag68-05.pdf. 
18 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. § 10 (amended 2006).  
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revenues of $750,000 and reviews if they were between $500,000 and $750,000.19 In 
January 2007 a bill was introduced in the Hawaii legislature that was similar in some 
respects to the California act, requiring audits and audit committees for nonprofit 
corporations with annual receipts of $1 million or more, and including extensive 
provisions relating to whistleblowers.20
 
As of January 1, 2007, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and California were the only 
states that required audits for charities. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire the only 
exemption is for religious organizations.21 California exempts religious organizations, 
cemetery corporations, educational institutions and health care agencies.22
Charities that solicit funds from the general public have been regulated for more than 30 
years. Today, 39 states actively regulate fund-raising, although the statues contain myriad 
exemptions for certain categories of charities, notably religious organizations, 
educational institutions and health care agencies.23 Nineteen of these contain an audit 
requirement.24  
 
In almost all of the jurisdictions that require corporations to have audit committees, an 
indirect concomitant is that there be independent directors to serve thereon. California, 
Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Vermont require that a majority of the 
directors of charitable corporations be “independent.”25 However, in all of these except 
New Hampshire, independence is defined in terms of compensation, while in New 
 
19 S.B. 1215, 79(R) Leg. (Tex. 2005).   
20 S.B. 73, 24th Leg. (Haw. 2007). available at:  http://capitol.hawaii.gov/sessioncurrent/bills/SB73_.htm. 
21 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 8F (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 7:19 and 7:28 (2006).   
22CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2004). 
 
23 See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 55 and 476-95.   
24 See Cal. Assemb. on Judiciary, Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1262 Assemb. (West June 22, 2004); S. Judiciary 
Comm., Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1262 Assemb. (West April 20, 2004).  See also Marion Fremont-Smith, 
Requirements of Financial Statements (Nov. 17, 2004) (unpublished chart on file with the author). 
25 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13-B, § 713A (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN., § 7:19-a (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §10-33-27 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 11B §8.13 (2006). 
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Hampshire the limitation, which does not apply to private foundations, defines 
independent in terms of family affiliation.26
 
Mandating Board Size and Committee Structure: The thrust of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and state laws with similar provisions was to increase accountability of directors. In 
direct contrast, the proposed revisions to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act would 
eliminate provisions in the existing Model Act designed to protect assets upon the 
dissolution of charities, permit broader delegation of directors’ duties and greatly narrow 
the extent to which fiduciaries could be held liable for violations of the  duties of care and 
loyalty, permitting nonprofit corporations in effect to grant to their directors what would 
amount to virtually complete immunity from suit.  
 
The current version of the model act was drawn from the California Nonprofit 
Corporation Act which divided nonprofits into three categories: public benefit (charities), 
mutual benefit, and religious corporations (under substantive law also charities) with 
provisions relating to organization, termination and duties of fiduciaries suited to their 
differences.27 The impetus for the proposed revision was to make it follow more closely 
revisions to the ABA Model Business Corporation Act that was adopted in 2002.28 The 
separate categories of nonprofit corporations are deleted in the proposed revision, as are 
provisions relating to the enforcement powers of the attorney general.  
 
One of the major current issues in regard to governance of nonprofit organizations is the 
degree to which directors can be assigned less than full responsibility for the affairs of the 
corporation. The proposed new Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that some, but 
less than all, of the powers, authority or functions of the board may be vested in a 
“designated body,” thereby relieving certain directors from their duties and liabilities 
with respect to those powers, authority or functions.29 Some commentators have 
 
26 Id.  
27 See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 52.    
28 See generally, MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, 3d Ed., Source Notes (Exposure Draft 2006).   
29 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, 3d Ed. §8.12(c) (Exposure Draft 2006).   
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suggested amending enabling statutes to permit different classes of board members – 
those with full responsibility for oversight, and others with specific functions such as 
fund-raising, or with no specific duties or responsibilities other than lending their name 
and prestige to the organization.30  
 
The ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law Discussion Draft criticized the concept of 
“designated bodies,” considering as better policy the current law view that all board 
members should have the same responsibility for governance.31 It suggested that it was 
possible to find alternative ways to recruit supporters to provide financial and other aid 
but who did not want to make the commitment required for full board governance.32  
The Discussion Draft also addressed the question of the size of a board, recommending 
that three unrelated individuals would be a necessary minimum in order to protect the 
public interest.33 Under current law fourteen states permit one director, and the others 
specify three or more.34 None set a maximum, although fifteen is considered by some 
commentators as optimal for for-profit corporations.35  As noted below, a limit of fifteen 
was proposed by the Senate Finance Committee Staff as a best practice, compliance with 
which would be required as a condition of certification for tax exemption.36 The charity 
governance bill submitted by the New York attorney general in 2006 did not contain a 
limit on size; rather it recommended that charities “with very large boards of directors 
(i.e. more than 25 members) should establish an executive committee.”37
 
30 Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small, Failing to Govern?  The Disconnect Between Theory and Reality in 
Nonprofit Boards, and How to Fix It, 3 STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REV. (Spring 2005). 
31 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 320 cmt. (b)(2) (Discussion Draft 2006).   
32 Id.  
33 Id. cmt. (g)(3).    
34 Marion Fremont-Smith, State Nonprofit Corporation Act Requirement (chart on file with author). 
35 Tax-Exempt Reform Proposals, Senate Finance Comm., 108th Cong. 12 (Roundtable Discussion July 22, 
2004). 
36 Tax-Exempt Reform Proposals, Senate Finance Comm., 108th Cong. 12 (Staff Discussion Draft 2004), 
available at: http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf.   
37 Memorandum from Elliot Spitzer, Summarizing N.Y. Attorney General’s Legislative Program Bill, #68-
05, available at: http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char_pdf/ag68-05memo.pdf. 
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Liability shields for directors and officers: On the issue of liability of board members for 
breaches of the duties of loyalty and care, the ALI Draft Principles propound a more 
restrictive rule than that contained in the proposed ABA Model Act, in section 370 
prohibiting the application of a monetary shield when there is violation not only of the 
duty of loyalty but also of the duty of care if bad faith was also involved.38 In contrast, 
the proposed ABA Model Act follows the provisions of the Model Business Corporation 
Act, 2.02-b(4) excepting from the protection of a shield only a financial benefit to which 
a director is not entitled, an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation, making 
improper distributions, or an intentional violation of criminal law.39  
 
Expanding The Legal Definition of Charitable Purposes    
     
Charitable purposes are to be found in the earliest cases in the common law and were first 
codified in the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses.40 In fact, the current definition of 
charitable purposes remains strikingly similar to the examples in that formulation. In the 
United States, the definitions are to be found in early court decisions.41 They have always 
been phrased in general terms, permitting expansion to reflect the changing needs of 
society.42 Restatement of Trusts, Second, adopted in 1959, summarized the then current 
law by listing five specific categories – relief of poverty; advancement of knowledge or 
education; advancement of religion; promotion of health, and governmental or municipal 
purposes - together with a fifth -“other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”43 
It then stated: “A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to 
 
38 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 370 (Discussion Draft 2006).   
39 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (d) (shield) and § 2.02(b)(5) (exception) (1987).   
40 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, c. 4, 43 Eliz.  
41 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 118-21. 
42 See id.   
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). 
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the community as to justify permitting property to be devoted to the purpose in 
perpetuity.”44  
 
Section 28 of the 2001 revisions to the Restatement of Trusts added to this sentence the 
phrase “and to justify the various other special privileges that are typically allowed to 
charitable trusts.”45 This was in reference to relaxation of the rules against perpetual 
existence and accumulations of income, as well as leniency in matters of interpretation. 
Each of the Restatements also emphasized that there is no fixed standard to determine 
what purposes are of such social interest to the community as to justify treating them as 
charitable: the interests of the community vary with time and place.46  
 
Legal recognition of the changing interest of the community and lenience in matters of 
interpretation of the definition of charity were demonstrated in the latter half of the 20th 
Century in cases challenging charities that restricted the class of beneficiaries on the basis 
of national origin, race, religion, gender, sexual preference, age, group, political 
affiliation or other characteristics or background.47 As the law has evolved, the courts 
have held that restrictions that involve state action or invidious discrimination will be 
held invalid.48 In general they have rarely found that state action is involved in the 
operation of charities, but have found invidious discrimination in the case of racial and 
some gender limitations, while upholding religious restrictions.49  
 
The Uniform Trust Code and the ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law contain phraseology 
that is essentially identical to that in Restatement of Trusts, Third, while Treasury 
Regulations defining charitable purposes refer to the English Statute of Elizabeth and 
 
44 Id. cmt. (b).  
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. (a) (2003). 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. (b)(1959) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 
cmt. (a) (2003). 
47 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 122. 
48 See id. at 117 – 25.   
49 See id.  
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formulations of the definition under state law.50 In general, the tendency continues to be 
one of expansion and liberalization, as signified in both the Restatement of Trusts, Third, 
and the ALI Principles. None of the other current proposals for modifying state charity 
law involve further amendment of the definition of charitable purposes.  
On November 6, 2006, The Charities Act 2006 (c.50) was adopted in the United 
Kingdom. The changes followed five years of consideration of changes in charity law.51 
It contained the first general statutory definition of charitable purpose, although it relied 
on the statute of charitable uses of 1601 and case law precedents. Under the act, a 
purpose is considered charitable if it meets two criteria: it must fall under one or more 
descriptions or "heads" of charity set forth in the act and if it is "for the public benefit."52 
The descriptions follow precedents, but permit expansion in the future by permitting new 
charitable purposes to be recognized.  The Public Benefit requirement is new. Under 
preexisting law, there was a presumption that the relief of poverty and the advancement 
of education or religion were for the public benefit, while other purposes were not 
charitable without a showing of this fact.53 Under the new statute, the presumption was 
abolished and the Charity Commission was directed to publish guidance as to the scope 
of the requirement. This change mirrors suggestions for amendment of the definition of 
charity in the Internal Revenue Code suggested by some Congressmen who favor 
adoption of a similar requirement in the case of health care agencies and educational 
organizations.  
 
Expanding Donors’ Rights to Modify the Terms of their Gifts 
 
Under common law, donors have no rights to change the terms of their gifts or release 
restrictions they may have placed on them, unless they have explicitly provided otherwise 
at the time of the gift. Section 7(a) of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds 
 
50 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 210 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006).  
51 Charities Act, 2006, c.50 (Eng.) 
52 See id. at §2.   
53 See id. at Explanatory Note 25.   
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Act (adopted in all jurisdictions except Alaska, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and South 
Dakota), permits donors to release restrictions they have placed on institutional funds, but 
affords them no right to agree to modifications or standing to sue to enforce restrictions.54 
During the process of revising UMIFA, the advisory committee to the Commissioners 
reflected differing positions. An early version included a provision permitting donors to 
approve of modifications of their gifts, similar to the provision in the Uniform Trust Code 
permitting donors to assent to terminations.55 The draft submitted to the Commissioners 
in 2005 did not include this provision. However, the retitled Uniform Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA), as adopted by the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in July 2006, permits an institution, with the donor’s written consent, 
to release or modify restrictions on the management, investment, or purposes of an 
institutional fund so long as it does not allow the fund to be used for a purpose other than 
that of the charity.56  
 
The draft ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law, in section 430(b)(1), explain that a restriction 
can be released or modified according to a procedure included in the original gift 
instrument; pursuant to the UMIFA provisions if they are available under state law; or in 
a court proceeding (with the participation of the donor only if he has reserved this right in 
the gift instrument).57 The draft ALI Comment notes, however, that donor input may be 
useful, suggesting that the charity may want to consult the donor, if living, or the court 
may permit the donor to be called as a witness or admit evidence as to his intent at the 
time of the gift.58  
As to the degree to which donor intent must be considered, in Restatement of Trusts, 
Third, the Reporter justifies what is termed a “more liberal application" than in the 
 
54 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, 7(a) (1972). 
55 Revisions to the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, §6, available at:  
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings_cle/spring2004/pt/UMIFA/gary.pdf. 
56 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §6, available at:  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2006final_act.htm.   
57 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 430(b)(1) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).   
58 Id. §450  cmt. (c). 
15 
 
 
                      
Second Restatement, both because settlors’ “preferences are almost inevitably a matter of 
speculation in any event and because it is reasonable to suppose that among [relatively] 
similar purposes charitably inclined settlors would tend to prefer those most beneficial to 
their communities.”59 Nonetheless, he suggests that the courts consult the donor if 
available, but if not, they should consider his relationships, social or religious affiliations, 
personal background, charitable-giving history, “and the like.”60  
 
Section 8 of Restatement of Trusts, Third, contains a rule governing the disposition of 
property on failure of an express trust.61 In those circumstances, generally the trustees 
will hold the property in resulting trust for the transferor or his successors. As to 
charitable gifts, Comment g of Section 8 states that “unless the settlor manifested an 
intention to substitute one or more other charitable purposes or a valid noncharitable 
purpose, or unless the doctrine of cy pres is applicable, a resulting trust normally 
arises.”62 However, noting that it is rare for a settlor to forbid application of cy pres and 
provide no other purpose or disposition, the Comment acknowledges that the cy pres 
doctrine will ordinarily apply.63  
 
While, as explained further below, the UTC does grant standing to donors to bring cy 
pres actions, it limits their rights to retain reversionary interests in charitable trusts. Thus, 
section 413(b) states that the court may not apply cy pres if in the terms of the trust there 
is a provision that would result in distribution of the trust property to a noncharitable 
beneficiary, but only if the donor is living at the date the reversion is to take effect or 
fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date the trust was created.64 The Comment 
gives as the rationale for this position that when there is a gift over on failure of an 
original charitable gift to noncharitable beneficiaries, the overriding concern of the court 
 
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. (d) (2003). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at § 8.  
62 Id. at § 8, cmt. (g).   
63 See id.   
64 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §413 (b) (amended 2005). 
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should be to preserve the original charitable trust, because doing so preserves the primary 
charitable intent of the testator and better serves the interests of society.65 Thus the only 
circumstance in which a noncharitable gift in default should be upheld would be if it was 
completely impracticable to apply it to a modified charitable use that could be 
demonstrated by overwhelming evidence to be contrary to the donor's intent. The UTC 
provision appears to be a compromise in that it permits reversions during the donor's life 
or, if shorter, twenty-one years. 
 
The draft ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law also recognize that failure of a charitable gift 
may under certain circumstances result in return of the property to the donor or his 
successors.66 In addition, under section 425, they provide that if a charity has in good 
faith accepted a gift lawfully made and subsequently it becomes aware of circumstances 
that make retention of the gift imprudent or undesirable, the charity may return the gift.67  
 
There are a few, well–publicized, recent cases in which donors have attempted to enforce 
the terms of their gifts by relying on a contract theory of trusts or specific terms in their 
gifts, with reverter or its equivalent being the remedy sought on the grounds of breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment.68 A Comment to section 750(a) in the draft Principles 
contrasts a reverter to individuals and a “gift over” to another charity specified in the gift 
instrument, suggesting that in the latter case, contract theory may be applicable and 
transfer of the property an appropriate “remedy.”69 Judicial acceptance of this approach 
will, of course, drastically expand the degree of donor control, as well as change the law 
of standing described below. 
 
Enabling Donors to Enforce the Terms of their Gifts 
 
65 Id. at §413 cmt. (amended 2005). 
66 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 425 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).   
67 Id. at § 425(b).  
68 See Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); L.B. 
Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation, 130 Cal.App.4th 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
69 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 750(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).   
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Many legal scholars have criticized restriction on donor standing, and since 2003 there 
has been an increasing number of instances reported in the press in which donors 
attempted to enforce the terms of restricted gifts made to corporate charities.70 Section 
405 of the Uniform Trust Code provides a statutory basis for actions with respect to 
charitable trusts, although in some instances they have been permitted under a contract 
theory without aid of a statute.71 Under the Uniform Trust Code, donors are empowered 
to sue to enforce the terms of their charitable gifts.72 This UTC provision is described in 
the Comments as a corollary to section 413, Cy Pres.73 It grants to the settlor of a 
charitable trust the right, among others, to maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.74 
The Comment notes that this provision is contrary to section 391 of the 1959 Restatement 
of Trusts, Second.75 Chester describes this provision as "a concession to a contractarian 
view of trust law promulgated by one of the UTC drafters, Professor John Langbein of 
Yale Law School."76
 
Under this approach, a trust is treated as the functional equivalent of a third-party 
beneficiary contract, with the grantor considered the promisee and the trustee the 
promisor. The terms of the trust are then specifically enforceable by the grantor. In the 
case of restricted gifts to corporate charities, this analysis applies if there is an express 
 
70 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 341-42. 
71 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §405 (amended 2005). 
72 Id. at §405 (c). 
73 Id. at §405, cmt. 
74 Id. at §413, cmt. 
75 Id. at §405, cmt. 
76 See Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c) of the 
Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is it and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611 (2003). See generally, Evelyn Brody, "From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: 
The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing," prepared for the NYU School of Law National Center on 
Philanthropy and the Law Conference "Grasping the Nettle: Respecting Donor Intent and Avoiding the 
Dead Hand" and forthcoming 2007 in GA. L. REV. (nonprofit symposium issue organized by David A. 
Brennen).  
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contract distinct from the gift. In the 2001 New York case of Smithers v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hospital Center, the court did appear to give credence to this view.77 A similar 
approach was taken in the case of L.B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA 
Foundation, decided in June 2005.78 There were a number of instances reported in 2005 
and 2006 in which donors were attempting to enforce the terms of gifts that included 
agreement by the charitable donee to acknowledge the gift by naming a fund or facility 
for the donors.79 A 2005 study by Eason of charitable gifts with naming conditions 
contains an excellent analysis of the difficulties that can arise in these situations.80  
 
A proposed amendment to UMIFA granting standing to donors was initially rejected by 
the UMIFA drafting committee in 2003.81 Although support for its inclusion was voiced 
at the 2005 meeting of the Commissioners, the final version, UPMIFA, adopted in 2006, 
does not include the UTC rule.82  
 
In 2005 Delaware enacted a statute granting a settlor of a charitable trust the right to 
maintain an action to enforce the trust and to designate persons born or unborn to succeed 
to his rights.83 This statute goes further than the UTC by permitting the donor to name 
successors.   
 
The primary argument in favor of modifying the common law limits on donors’ rights is 
that in the majority of the states, the attorney general is not fulfilling his duty to protect 
charitable assets; and that this failure is unlikely to change, given the shortage of funds 
 
77 See 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
78 See 130 Cal.App.4th 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
79 See generally, John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming Gifts: 
When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 (2005). 
80See id. 
81 Revisions to the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, Donor Standing, available at:  
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings_cle/spring2004/pt/UMIFA/gary.pdf. 
82 UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §6, available at:  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2006final_act.htm.   
8375 Del. Laws, c. 97, § 3 (2005), amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §3303.  
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available in most states for the office of the attorney general. The donor is considered the 
most appropriate person to fill the gap.  As noted it is likely that the UTC will be widely 
adopted within the near future, and thus one can expect to see the common law doctrine 
of limited standing eroded at least in regard to charitable trusts.  
 
Liberalizing the Doctrines of Cy Pres and Deviation  
 
Cy pres is the name of a doctrine that has been a part of the common law of charities 
since the Middle Ages under which, if the terms of a charitable gift are no longer capable 
of being carried out as originally designated, the courts may modify the gift to assure its 
continued utility to society. Until the start of the 20th Century, the courts construed the cy 
pres doctrine narrowly by requiring demonstration that the donor had a general charitable 
intent before applying the doctrine and, in its application, that new purposes have a close 
proximity to the original ones.84 Liberalization started to appear at the start of the 20th 
Century as some judges looked at the broad purposes of a gift and expressed more 
concern for the needs of society than the narrow wishes of donors.85 The Restatement of 
Trusts, Second, adopted in 1959, recognized this expansion of the traditional standards by 
providing in section 399 that it was permissible for the court to order application of the 
property “to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention 
of the settlor.”86  
 
Further liberalization of the cy pres doctrine was signaled with the adoption in 2003 of 
section 67 of Restatement of Trusts, Third, in which “wastefulness” was added to the 
conditions under which the doctrine could be applied: namely the purpose has become 
unlawful, impracticable, or impossible to achieve.87 The guide for determining an 
alternative purpose was that it “reasonably approximates the designated purpose.”88 The 
 
84 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 174–82. 
85 See id.   
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
88 Id.  
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Comment noted that the term “wasteful” was intended to mean more than inefficient but 
less than destructive or ultra vires and that a purpose would be wasteful only if 
circumstances suggested that the donor would not have imposed the contested restriction 
had he know of the unanticipated circumstances.89  
 
This formulation of the cy pres doctrine was incorporated in section 413 of the Uniform 
Trust Code (UTC), adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2003. 
Paragraph (a) of section 413 of the UTC provides that if a charitable purpose “becomes 
unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve or wasteful:  
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;  
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor’s successors in interest; 
and  
(3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust 
property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the 
settlor’s charitable purposes.”90  
 
The Comments make it clear that this section was intended to codify the court’s inherent 
authority to apply cy pres to modify an administrative or dispositive term, thereby 
removing a distinction that was made in the common law and that in almost every state 
between the doctrine of cy pres and a more liberal doctrine called “deviation” that applied 
when a proposed modification was not to the purposes of the gift as is the case with cy 
pres, but to the methods prescribed by the donor for its administration. 91 It noted that the 
new formulation was similar to the rule in Tentative Draft No. 3 of Restatement of 
Trusts, Third, section 67 (the final version not yet having been adopted by the ALI), by 
presuming a general charitable intent.92 Finally, the Comment makes clear that the 
doctrine applies not only to trusts, but also to other types of charitable dispositions, 
 
89 Id. at § 67 cmt. (c).  
90 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §413(a) (amended 2005). 
91 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §413 cmt. (amended 2005). 
92 See id.  
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including those to charitable corporations.93 Although it does not control dispositions 
made in nontrust form, the Comment recognizes that courts often refer to the principles 
governing charitable trusts, which would include the UTC.94  
 
A corollary to section 413 of the UTC is to be found in paragraph (b) of section 405 of 
the UTC. Paragraph (a) of this section contains a definition of charitable purposes that 
restates what is described in the Comment as "well-established categories of charitable 
purposes" found in Restatement of Trusts, Second, and the then-Tentative Draft 
Restatement, Third.95 Subsection (b) then provides that "If the terms of a charitable trust 
do not indicate a particular charitable purpose or beneficiary, the court may select one or 
more charitable purposes or beneficiaries. The selection must be consistent with the 
settlor's intention to the extent it can be ascertained."96  The Comment contains a 
paraphrase of section 413(a): "A trust failing to state a general charitable purpose does 
not fail upon failure of the particular means specified in the terms of the trust. The court 
must instead apply the trust property in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable 
purposes to the extent they can be ascertained.”97 This final phrase does not appear in 
section 413(b), raising the question of how far a court must in fact attempt to "ascertain" 
the original purposes.  
 
The ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Preliminary Draft Number 3, 
published in May 2005, contains in section 440 a formulation that adopts “the liberalized 
standards of Restatement of Trusts, Third, while providing more guidance on factors that 
determine the rigor or liberality of available relief.”98 Unlike the UTC, the distinction 
between cy pres and deviation is retained, with greater flexibility accorded in determining 
when deviation may be applied and the degree of proximity to the donor’s original intent. 
 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §405 cmt. (amended 2005). 
96 UNIF. TRUST CODE, §405(b) (amended 2005). 
97 Id. at §405 cmt. 
98 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 440 cmt. (a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).   
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Recourse to donor intent is retained as a guide in determining alternate use. If the gift 
instrument provides for a gift over to an alternate beneficiary, deviation may by applied, 
but cy pres will not “ordinarily” be available if transferring the gift to the taker in default 
will carry out the donor’s charitable purpose.99  
 
UPMIFA, adopted by the Commissioners in July 2006, added three important provisions 
making the doctrines of cy pres and deviation applicable to institutional funds, defined as 
any fund held by an institution exclusively for its charitable purposes.100 In addition to 
granting power to donors to release or modify restrictions described above, section 6(b) 
contains a restatement of the doctrine of deviation: 
If a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the management or investment of an 
institutional fund becomes impracticable or wasteful or impairs the management or 
investment of the fund, or if because of circumstances not anticipated by the donor a 
modification will further the purposes of the fund, the court, upon application of the 
institution, may modify the restriction.101
 
This section requires advance notice to the attorney general and then states: “To the 
extent practicable, any modification must be made in accordance with the donor’s 
probable intention.”102  
 
Section 6(c) provides that if a particular charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a 
gift instrument on the use of an institutional fund: namely, if it becomes “unlawful, 
impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful,” the court, after notice to the attorney 
general, may modify the purpose or restriction in a manner consistent with the charitable 
purpose expressed in the gift instrument.103  
 
99 Id. at § 440(d).   
100 UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §2(5), available at:  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2006final_act.htm.   
101 See id. at §6(b). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at §6(c). 
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Unique to the act is a provision permitting modification of small restricted funds without 
resort to the courts. If a restricted fund has a value less than a stated amount ($25,000 is 
suggested in the act), and if more than a fixed number of years (20 is suggested) has 
passed since the fund was established, and if the conditions under which cy pres can be 
applied exist, the charity, after notice to the attorney general, may release or modify the 
restriction in whole or in part.104 There are similar provisions in the laws of some states 
permitting termination of smaller trusts, again reflecting the trend toward liberalization of 
the conditions under which donor imposed restrictions can be modified.105  
 
In direct contrast to these developments, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
October 2006 refused to grant the request of the trustee of a private foundation to modify 
the terms of the trust to permit the trust to meet the requirements of Internal Revenue 
Code section 4942 and Massachusetts law incorporating those requirements.106 The trust 
was established in 1959 to distribute the net income for scholarships. The court's 
rationale was that to do so would require distributions from principal and this would 
conflict with the donor's expressed intent that the scholarships continue "in perpetuity". It 
held that "Allowing the requested reformation might avoid tax liability under Sec 4942, 
but would almost certainly result in inappropriate diminution of the trust's principal."107 
In reaching this conclusion, the court erroneously equated income yield with total return 
and ignored the principles underlying modern prudent investment theory that have been 
incorporated in Massachusetts statutes, specifically the Modern Prudent Investor Act and 
UMIFA.   
 
The court further noted that reformation of trusts had been allowed in cases in which 
there was either a "scrivener's error" or a clear intent on the part of the settlor to 
minimize, or avoid, adverse tax consequences, and held that it could not conclude that the 
 
104 See id. at §6(d). 
105 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 179. 
106 U.S. Trust Co v. Attorney General, 854 N.E. 2d 1231 (Mass. 2006). 
107 Id. at 1235. 
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settlor intended this outcome. No mention was made of the doctrine of deviation which, 
in this instance would, under Massachusetts precedents have afforded the appropriate 
rationale for permitting the reformation. 108
 
The changes in charity law adopted in England in 2006 included provisions liberalizing 
the cy pres doctrine similar to those being adopted or under consideration in the United 
States. Section 18 of The British Charities Act of 2006 amended the traditional cy pres 
rule found in section 13 of the 1993 Charities Act that required new purposes to be as 
close as practicable to the original purposes.109 Under new section 14B, the courts or the 
Charity Commission are required to consider three matters when applying the doctrine: 1. 
the desirablility of choosing new purposes that are close to the original purposes; 2. the 
spirit of the gift by which the property came to the charity; 3. the need to ensure that the 
charity has purposes which are suitable and effective in the light of current social and 
economic purposes.110 Thus, proximity to original purpose is no longer to be considered 
paramount, rather, equal weight is to be given to all three requirements.  
 
The act also contained provisions dealing with instances in which property is transferred 
from one charity to another where the original purposes are still useful, but the court or 
the Commission believes that the it can be used more effectively in conjunction with 
other property.111 In those instances, the act permits the court or the Commission to 
require the trustees of the transferee to use the property for purposes as similar as 
practicable to the original purposes for which the property was held.112  
  
Cy pres applied to charitable corporations: An important, largely undecided issue in 
regard to the doctrines of cy pres and deviation is whether and if so to what extent they 
are applicable to assets held by charitable corporations. Both the Second and Third 
 
108 See infra pp. 43-44.     
109 Charities Act, 1993, c.10, §(Eng.) 
110 Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 18 (Eng.) 
111 See id. at §18(4). 
112 See id. 
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Restatements of Trusts make it clear that the doctrines apply to all funds devoted to 
charitable purposes, including gifts to and property held by charitable corporations that 
are subject to specific restrictions, but not for the general purposes of the corporate 
charity.113 Some courts and commentators take a contrary position, holding that these 
doctrines do not apply to assets of a charitable corporation that have been received for 
services rendered or to income from the investment of those receipts, it being within the 
power of the board to determine their disposition.114 Others go further, arguing that the 
doctrines should apply only to gifts specifically designated to be used for named purposes 
or to be permanently held as endowment.115
 
Section 240 of Preliminary Draft No. 3 of the Principles of Nonprofit Law contains a 
liberal position in this regard, providing that the governing board of a charity other than a 
charitable trust may change its purpose to another charitable purpose without the need to 
determine that the current purpose has failed.116 The determination of a new purpose is to 
be considered a matter of business judgment, not subject to judicial review except for 
abuse of discretion.117 In contrast, restricted gifts are subject to the rule applicable to 
charitable trusts, requiring that the nonprofit corporation institute judicial proceedings to 
change the purposes of those gifts, unless their terms provide otherwise.118 This proposed 
rule follows from a decision by the drafter that there is a difference in the legal regime of 
trusts and corporations; that founders of charities are free to choose the regime they wish; 
and that charitable trustees will be limited in their ability to change purposes, while a 
corporate board has broad freedom to change its purposes and to apply existing funds to 
the new purposes, with some limitations described below.119  
 
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
114 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 240 cmt. (a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 
2005).   
115 See id.  
116 See id. at § 240(c)(1).  
117 See id. at § 240(c)(2). 
118 See id. at § 240(a). 
119 See id. at § 240 cmt. (a). 
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      The Principles also posit a duty to keep the purposes of the charity current and useful, 
thereby rejecting a duty of obedience to the extent that it prevents a board from altering 
purposes prospectively.120 Most important, there is no requirement that the new purposes 
reasonably approximate or reasonably relate to the prior purposes. This proposed rule is 
contrary to the law in a number of states and the Reporter acknowledged that such a 
liberal policy may have untoward consequences that may require some degree of state 
oversight or greater judicial control, as for example when the purposes of a charitable 
hospital are changed after its conversion to support the arts, or, as posited in a 
Massachusetts case, from operating a home for abandoned animals to support of 
“research vivisectionists.”121
 
Section 245 of the draft Principles provides that a charity other than a charitable trust, 
after it has changed its purposes, may use its assets, other than restricted gifts imposing 
contrary requirements, for any pre- or post-amendment charitable purpose.122 The effect 
of this is that restricted gifts must be applied for their original purpose unless the gift 
instrument provides for modification, UMIFA is available, or there is judicial reformation 
under cy pres or deviation. However, the other corporate assets, namely unrestricted gifts 
and non-donated assets may be directed by the board to any purposes, old or new. This 
includes income received from the sale of goods and services as well as income earned 
from investment of earnings and of unrestricted gifts.123 The assumption here is that 
unless a donor specifically imposes restrictions, he has implicitly consented to future 
amendments to the purposes for which his gifts may be used.  
 
Statutes in twenty-three states govern the distribution of assets on dissolution of 
charitable corporations, requiring application of the property under the cy pres doctrine, 
but with no requirement of a showing of general charitable intent, although a right of 
 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at § 240 cmt. (d), citing Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hospital, 494 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 
1986). 
122 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 245 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).   
123 Id. at § 245 cmt. (a).  
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reversion expressly stated will be respected.124 In New York the courts have articulated 
what is described as a quasi-cy pres doctrine that applies to the general assets upon 
dissolution of a charitable corporation under which the degree of proximity to original 
purposes is more relaxed than is the case with charitable trusts or restricted funds of 
charitable corporations.125   
 
As a practical matter, state laws governing dissolution of charitable corporations and 
termination of charitable trusts rest on a floor provided by a requirement for obtaining 
exemption from federal income taxes under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) that 
a charity’s governing instrument contain a provision that on its dissolution or termination, 
its assets must be distributed to other organizations then exempt from federal income 
tax.126 This test can be met if there is a similar requirement under state law that is 
enforced locally. In 1982, the Service issued a Revenue Procedure stating that only eight 
states had enacted legislation meeting the Code requirements, so that charities in the 
remaining ones and the District of Columbia were required to adopt an express 
dissolution provision.127 This requirement has been of great importance in the vast 
number of states in which charity law is not actively enforced, and it set a precedent for 
federal/state cooperation that was extended in the 1969 private foundation provisions 
described below.  
 
Expanding and Enhancing State Enforcement  
 
There has been far less current interest in expanding or improving regulation of charities 
at the state level than in issues of governance. Only eight states require charitable 
corporations and trusts to register and file annual financial reports with the attorney 
general, one more than was the case in 1965.128 Exempted from these requirements in all 
 
124 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 185.  
125 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §1005 (2006). 
126 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2006).  
127 See Rev. Proc. 82-2, 1982-1 C.B. 367.  
128 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 476-95.  
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of these states are religious organizations, while California and New York exempt 
educational organizations and California also exempts hospitals. In four other states, 
certain charitable trusts must register and report, but they are few in number compared to 
charitable corporations. Active enforcement programs are in place in almost all of these 
twelve states and in a handful of others, notably Pennsylvania. In 2006 the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were requested to consider revisiting the Uniform 
Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Funds Act, or of repealing it for lack of interest. 
Although 39 states regulate solicitation of charitable funds from the general public, these 
statutes are framed in terms of consumer protection, not the administration of charitable 
assets.129 The 2004 California statute requiring mandatory audits did contain provisions 
regulating professional fund raisers, while the New York legislation that was adopted 
clarified state laws regarding dissolutions and terminations of charities.130 Provisions that 
would have extended the enforcement powers of the attorney general and the courts have 
not been passed.      
 
The original bill submitted to the legislature by the Massachusetts attorney general in 
2005 contained provisions that would have clarified his enforcement powers, but after 
objections from the nonprofit community, these provisions were deleted.131         
Another approach to expanding the enforcement powers of the attorney general was taken 
by the Ohio attorney general in 2006. Rather than seeking legislation, he issued a set of 
proposed amendments to the regulations under the Ohio Charitable Trust Act that would, 
among other changes, have had the effect of limiting or eliminating payment of fiduciary 
compensation, mandated audit committees and adoption of conflict of interest policies 
and greatly increased the scope of annual financial reports.132 The changes were to be 
 
129 See id. at 317. 
130 Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2004); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. § 10 
(amended 2006). 
131 Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, Mass. Att’y Gen., available at:  
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=2059. 
132 Proposed Changes to OHIO ADMIN. CODE 109:1-1, available at:  
http://www.ag.state.oh.us/business/pubs/char/rule/Full_Text_Changes.pdf. 
29 
 
 
                      
accomplished by suggestions that conflict of interest policies, together with excessive 
compensation and expense reimbursement policies “should” be adopted, coupled with 
expanded annual reporting requirements designed to elicit compliance with the 
recommendations, with threat of an investigation for failure to comply.133 The proposals 
generated widespread criticism from the sector, particularly from hospitals and health 
care agencies, which were targeted in the proposed regulations. The proposals were 
subsequently amended, shrinking from 46 pages to seven. The revision included 
measures to increase the investigatory powers of the attorney general and the 
establishment of a citizens advisory committee to assist him in the execution of his duties 
under the act.134 The Massachusetts attorney general appointed such a committee in 1961 
without legislative authorization, and succeeding attorneys general have followed the 
precedent.135 In 2001 the Illinois legislature enacted a bill directing establishment of a 
permanent charitable advisory committee in the office of the attorney general. It is the 
only state in which such a committee has been created by the legislature.136
 
Proposed legislation introduced in Texas in 2005 would have mandated audits for certain 
charities and required that the financial reports be made publicly available to the attorney 
general and to the general public on demand under the same terms and conditions that 
apply under the Internal Revenue Code to Form 990, the annual information return 
required of public charities.137 Monetary penalties would be imposed for violation of the 
requirements. It did not pass during the 2005 legislative session.  
 
133 See id.  
134 Revised Proposed Changes to OHIO ADMIN. CODE 109:1-1, available at:  
http://www.oano.org/Docs/AG_Revised.pdf.   
135 See the study of several models of nonprofit-sector/attorney-general working relationships in DAVID 
BIEMESDERFER and ANDRAS KOSARAS, The Value of Relationships Between State Charity Regulators and 
Philanthropy, FORUM OF REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF GRANTMAKERS AND COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS 
(2006), available at:  http://www.givingforum.org/cgi-bin/doc_rep/public/file.pl/3664/regpubfull.pdf. 
136 Solicitation for Charity Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/23 (2001), available at:  
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/documents/022504600K23.htm. 
137 S. B. No. 1215, 79(R) (Tex. 2005), available at: 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79R/billtext/pdf/SB01215I.pdf.  
30 
 
 
                      
The District of Columbia in 2006 also was considering measures to improve regulation of 
charities; the District is unique in that the District attorney general has traditionally taken 
the position that he has no power to regulate charities. The proposal, drafted at the 
request of the Mayor, would amend the District's nonprofit corporation, charitable 
solicitation and consumer protection acts, substituting the attorney general for the mayor 
as the official authorized to institute involuntary dissolutions, and granting him new 
remedies and investigatory powers.138 This initiative is unique in the history of the 
District and of particular importance in view of the fact that almost all federally chartered 
charitable corporations are within the jurisdiction of the District. 
 
A different approach to annual reports was taken in a bill introduced in the Hawaii 
legislature in 2007 that would amend the Nonprofit Corporation act by requiring 
nonprofit corporations with gross revenue of one million dollars or more, excluding 
revenue from certain government contracts, to file annually a complete audited financial 
report with the Department of Corporations.139 Willful or persistent failure to file would 
constitute a breach of the directors' and officers' duty and subject them and the 
corporation to suit of the attorney general.140 It was unclear whether the reports would be 
public record, but in all events the provision would have the effect of establishing a 
registry of financial information about nonprofit corporations in the state. Noteworthy is 
the fact that the provisions appear to apply to all nonprofit corporations, not just charities.  
 
In contrast to the lack of interest in expanding the powers of state attorneys general to 
enforce the duties of charitable fiduciaries, during the period between 1996 and 2000, 
twenty-five states enacted thirty statutes to regulate the conversion of nonprofit charities, 
most notably hospitals and health insurance providers, to for-profit status.141 These 
 
138 See Nonprofit Organizations Oversight Improvement Act of 2006, D.C. B16-0759, available at:  
http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20060525131713.pdf  
139 S.B. 73, 24th Leg. § 2(Haw. 2007). available at:  
http://capitol.hawaii.gov/sessioncurrent/bills/SB73_.htm. 
140 Id. at § 6(g).   
141 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 432. 
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statutes were in response to a number of conversions in which assets were sold for less 
than fair market value to insiders, and the proceeds of sale passed into private hands 
rather than being held for continuing charitable purposes.142 Several proposed 
conversions involved charities operating in several states and entailed what became 
conflicts between state officials attempting to assert jurisdiction to prevent charitable 
assets from leaving the state.143 The speed with which the states acted was undoubtedly 
due to the size of the assets involved and the importance of health care corporations to the 
communities involved. It is of interest that despite these developments, one of the Senate 
Finance Committee Staff proposals described below would transfer regulation of 
conversions from the states to the IRS, regardless of the fact that its powers to regulate 
these transactions are extremely limited.   
 
FEDERAL LAW: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS 
   
The Proponents of Change 
 
Traditionally, the Treasury Department has taken the lead in framing major revisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code, working primarily with the House Ways and Means 
Committee. In some instances, the Finance Committee has assumed primary 
responsibility for framing amendments, usually on discrete matters that are of particular 
interest to its leaders. Such has been the case in recent years. Senator Grassley, the former 
chairman of the Finance Committee, has been joined by his counterpart Senator Baucus, 
in supporting a major research project undertaken by the Committee staff that resulted in 
a 2004 Staff Report that contained proposals to amend not only the substantive 
restrictions on charities, but also to vastly expand federal regulation of exempt 
organizations.144  
 
142 See id.   
143 See id. at 366-67.   
144 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 108TH CONG., TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS: STAFF 
DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf. 
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In the fall of 2006, Senator Grassley conducted hearings on hospitals, focusing on the 
amount of charity care they were providing and the compensation of their officers.145 
During this same period, the Minority Staff of the Finance Committee prepared a report 
entitled "Investigation of Jack Abramoff's Use of Tax-Exempt Organizations,"146 which 
contained recommendations that are described below.  
 
During this same period, the Ways and Means Committee also focused on hospitals and 
other health care organizations. The Chairman conducted a series of hearings in 2005 
during which he questioned the rationale for tax exemption of these organizations - and 
others that rely principally on receipts for services.147 The issues raised for the hospitals 
were the degree of charity care they were providing and whether and how they can be 
differentiated from for-profit corporations that provide the same services for a fee. This 
question is not new to Congress; in the past it has been raised in connection with the 
effectiveness of the tax on unrelated business income and the degree to which 
"commerciality" in operations should be considered incompatible with exemption.  
 
A third source for proposals for amendments to the Internal Revenue Code has been the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, a standing committee of Congress, which serves as a 
permanent resource for the tax committees, advising on technical matters, preparing 
estimates of the revenue effect of proposed legislation as well as background information 
for the committees during hearings, and providing summaries of tax legislation that 
become the basis of the legislative history of specific bills. The Joint Committee, in 
January 2005, issued a major set of proposals to amend the IRC provisions governing tax 
 
145 See Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit Hospitals: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006). 
146 See MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF JACK ABRAMOFF’S 
USE OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Print 109-68). 
147 See The Tax Exempt Hospital: Hearing  Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption : Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
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exempt charities, in some instances endorsing the 2004 proposals from the Finance 
Committee Staff, while in others suggesting more stringent limits.148 In addition to 
committee recommendations, from time to time individual legislators will introduce 
reform proposals. Historically, it was not uncommon for congressmen to conduct 
hearings and otherwise promote their initiatives individually, the most prominent being 
Congressman Patman who is credited as the originator of the restrictions on private 
foundations enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.149 The power of individual 
Congressman is no longer comparable to that in the 60s and 70s.  
 
The Tax Section of the American Bar Association has always been a major proponent of 
changes in the tax code, and its Committee on Exempt Organizations has had primary 
responsibility for providing analysis and commentary on amendments affecting 
organizations under its jurisdiction. Within the nonprofit sector, there are myriad 
organizations that lobby on behalf of their members and the sector at large. Notable are 
Independent Sector and the Council on Foundations, while there are several hundred 
organizations formed to support various segments of the nonprofit universe.  
In 2005, in response to requests from Senators Grassley and Baucus to respond to the 
proposals from the Finance Committee staff,150 Independent Sector constituted a Panel 
on the Nonprofit Sector. The Panel issued a preliminary report in March 2005,151 a Final 
Report the following June,152 and a Supplemental Report in June 2006.153 Shortly 
 
148 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (JCS-02-05), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf [hereinafter 
STAFF OF J. COMM.]. 
149 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2 at 72-76. 
150 See Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Fin. Comm., and Sen. Max Baucus, Ranking 
Member, Sen. Fin. Comm., to Diana Aviv, President and C.E.O., Independent Sector (Sept. 22, 2004), 
available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/SFCltr.pdf. 
151 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SENATE FINANCE 
COMMITTEE (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf.  
152 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT 
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thereafter, the Panel constituted a special committee to consider self-regulation,154 with a 
report anticipated in early 2007. The Panel made major efforts to include the entire 
nonprofit community in its deliberations, through a web site,155 a number of regional 
open meetings, and open conference calls. The specific recommendations from these 
groups are summarized below.  
 
Regulating Self-Dealing by Fiduciaries of Public Charities: the Excess Benefit Provisions 
of Internal Revenue Code Section 4958 
 
The first major change in the substantive provisions in the Internal Revenue Code dealing 
with tax exempt charities since 1969 was passage in 1996 of prohibitions on certain self-
dealing transactions between publicly supported charities and persons who were in 
positions to exert substantial influence over the organization.156 They are described as 
“Intermediate Sanctions” by virtue of the fact that the penalty for breach of the 
prohibitions is not loss of tax exemption,157 as is the case with the prohibitions against 
private benefit and private inurement that have always applied to all tax exempt 
charities.158 Instead, the provisions call for imposition of excise taxes on any 
“disqualified persons” who receive the excess benefit and those managers of the charity 
 
SECTOR (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
PANEL, FINAL REPORT]. 
153 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2006), available at 
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/supplement/Panel_Supplement_Final.pdf [hereinafter PANEL, 
SUPPLEMENT]. 
154 See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, New Committee to Advise the Panel to the Nonprofit Sector on Self-
Regulation, http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/press/advisorygroup/view?searchterm=self-regulation (Mar. 28, 
2006). 
155 See http://www.nonprofitpanel.org (last visited October 24, 2006).  
156 See Pub. L. No. 104-168, §1311, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79 (codified as I.R.C. §4958 (1996)). 
157 See I.R.C. §4958 (West 2006). 
158 See Treas. Reg. §§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2006). 
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who willfully approved of the arrangement knowing that it was prohibited.159 
Disqualified persons are defined as those in a position to exercise substantial influence 
over the charity,160 whether or not they have official positions as directors, officers or 
trustees.161 Although the Code provisions follow in form the absolute prohibitions on 
self-dealing applicable since 1969 to private foundations transactions, self-dealing 
transactions between publicly supported charities and their disqualified persons are 
permitted so long as the disqualified persons do not receive more than fair market value 
and the excise tax is applied only to the amount of the excess benefit.162  
 
This legislation had long been supported by the Internal Revenue Service as well as 
Independent Sector and most commentators, who recognized that revocation of 
exemption is an inappropriate tool for enforcing fiduciary duties.163 In some instances 
revocation is too severe a sanction; in others, it is not a sufficient deterrent, because it 
may harm the charity while permitting the persons responsible for the transgressions to 
continue to control its destiny. The 2004 proposals from the Staff of the Senate Finance 
Committee, described in the following section, recommended repealing these provisions 
and substituting for them the more drastic prohibitions against any self-dealing that apply 
to private foundations. In contrast, the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended 
tightening the existing excess benefit rules, while adding a tax on the charity itself, 
contrary to the recommendations of virtually all scholars who have considered the 
efficacy of the tax exemption provisions.  
 
Reform Proposals from the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee 2004; the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006; and Responses from the Sector 
 
 
159 See I.R.C. §4958 (West 2006). 
160 I.R.C. §4958(f)(1) (West 2006); Treas. Reg. §53.4958-3 (2002). 
161 See I.R.C. §4941 (West 2006). 
162 See I.R.C. §4958(c)(1)(A) (West 2006); Treas. Reg. §53.4958-1 (2002); Treas. Reg. §53.4958-4 (2002). 
163 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2 at 99-100, 379 (2004). 
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As noted above, the most recent impetus for change in federal nonprofit law and 
regulation has centered on a set of legislative proposals circulated by the Staff of the 
Senate Finance Committee in spring 2004.164 In addition to tightening numerous 
substantive provisions governing the administration of tax exempt charities, these 
proposals were designed to expand the enforcement powers of the IRS and the federal 
courts by providing them with new enforcement tools that are currently available only in 
state courts,165 as well as grant standing to members of the general public to sue charities 
and their fiduciaries for breach of the federal rules.166   
 
The report issued by the Joint Committee on Taxation in January 2005167 contained 
proposed amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that in almost all instances are more 
restrictive than those recommended by the Finance Committee Staff.168  The hearings 
held by the Ways and Means Committee in 2005 considered revisions to the basic 
requirements for exemption of hospitals and, possibly, other charities that rely for 
financial support primarily on fees for services, questioning whether they deserved the 
benefits of tax exemption in light of their similarity to for-profit entities conducting 
essentially identical activities.169  
 
In September 2006 the Senate Finance Committee took up the question of exemptions for 
hospitals, echoing some of the concerns of the Ways and Means Committee, but focusing 
primarily on the efficacy of Code provisions requiring hospitals to provide charity care 
 
164 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 108TH CONG., TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS: STAFF 
DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf. 
165 See id. at 16-17. 
166 See id. at 17-18. 
167 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 140.  
168 See id. at 220-337. 
169 See, e.g., The Tax Exempt Hospital: Hearing  Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 
(2005); Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption : Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
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and community benefit as a condition for exemption.170 The Chairman also indicated 
concern with high levels of executive compensation and benefits being provided by 
nonprofit hospitals, and indicated that his staff would be drafting corrective legislation.171   
 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006: In August 2006 Congress enacted the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006, which contained provisions affecting charities and their 
donors.172 Almost all of the provisions follow the spirit if not the letter of a number of the 
proposals made by the Staffs of the Senate Finance Committee and the Joint Committee 
on Taxation. Among the provisions designed to “responsibly regulate exempt 
organizations,”173 organizations previously exempt from filing annual returns because 
their gross receipts did not exceed $25,000 will henceforth be required to file an annual 
notice containing current contact and some basic financial information.174 The Act 
increased the rates of fines and penalties applicable to public charities and private 
foundations;175 required public disclosure of the information contained in Form 990-T, 
the return filed by organizations that receive taxable unrelated business income;176 
adopted new substantiation rules for gifts of tangible personal property;177 and included 
new requirements for exemption for credit counseling organizations,178 a category of tax 
exempt entities that had been of particular concern to the Finance Committee 
 
170 See Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit Hospitals: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006). 
171 See id.  
172 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§1201-1245, 120 Stat. 780.  
173 REP. BILL THOMAS, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006: DETAILED 
SUMMARY OF CHARITABLE PROVISIONS 2 (July 28, 2006), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/taxdocs/072806charitable.pdf#search=%22%22responsibly%20
regulate%20exempt%20organizations%22%22. 
174 See id. at §1223, 120 Stat. 1090-91 (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. §6033 (West 2006)). 
175 See id. at §1212, 120 Stat. 1074-75 (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. §§4941-45, 4958 (West 2006)). 
176 See id. at §1225, 120 Stat. 1093-94 (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. §6104 (West 2006)). 
177 See id. at §§1218-1219, 120 Stat. 1080-86. 
178 See id. at §1220, 120 Stat. 1086-89 (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. §§501, 513 (West 2006)). 
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leadership179 as well as the Government Relations and the House Ways and Means 
Committees.  
 
The most far-reaching changes in the 2006 Act will affect two types of charities whose 
operations had been of particular concern to the Finance Committee during its 2004 and 
2005 hearings: donor advised funds and “supporting organizations” described in section 
509(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code180 – organizations that qualify as public charities 
rather than private foundations by virtue of their connection to and support of other 
public charities.181 In addition to directing the Treasury to conduct a one-year study of 
these entities to determine if additional restrictions are necessary,182 the Act extended the 
excess benefit transactions prohibitions to certain transactions between them and their 
donors and other related parties and added new requirements designed to increase the 
degree of accountability of certain supporting organizations to the public charities they 
support.183 These provisions are described more fully below. Finally, the Act contained a 
provision long advocated by the Joint Committee on Taxation and state charity officials 
that permits the IRS to exchange information with state regulators about charities 
violating the Code provisions.184  
 
The need for greater understanding and cooperation between state attorneys general and 
the Internal Revenue Service was highlighted in a unanimous decision of the 
 
179 See Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption : Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
180 See, e.g., Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 109th Cong. 33-35 (2005) (statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, 
Congressional Research Service) 
181 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §1241, 120 Stat. 1103 (to be codified as 
amended at I.R.C. §509(a)(3) (West 2006)). 
182 See id. at §1226, 120 Stat. 1094. 
183 See id. at §§1231-1235, 1241-1245, 120 Stat. 1094-1108.  
184 See id. at §1224, 120 Stat. 1091-93 (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. §§6103, 6104, 7431 (West 
2006)). 
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided in October 2006.185 The case was brought 
by the trustee of a perpetual trust established in 1959 to apply the net income to provide 
scholarships in amounts not to exceed $400 each to graduates of the high school in the 
city in which the donor resided. In its petition, the trustee requested the court to modify 
the terms of the trust in three respects. The court granted its requests to include students 
from other high schools established in the city and to increase the amount of the 
individual scholarships. It refused, however, a request to permit the trustee to increase the 
aggregate annual distributions to equal the amount required to be distributed by private 
foundations under Internal Revenue Code section 4942, currently equal to the greater of 
the net income of the trust or five percent of the value of the foundation's investment 
assets.186 The trustee had alleged that the change was necessary if the trust was to avoid 
the tax on private foundations imposed under section 4942 (as well as under 
Massachusetts General Laws section 68A). 
  
At the time the petition was filed, this tax was equal to fifteen per cent of the difference 
between the required distribution and the amount actually distributed at the end of each 
tax year in which it remains undistributed. The Pension Reform Act of 2006 increased the 
tax to 30% effective for tax years beginning after the date of enactment which was 
August 2006. The court held that such a change, although it would "avoid a relatively 
small tax," would result in annual distributions of a large portion of the principal, thereby 
departing from the donor's intent that the trust be perpetual.187 This conclusion ignored, 
as did the briefs submitted by attorneys for the trustee, the fact that section 4942 provides 
for two levels of tax: an initial tax equal at the date the decision was rendered to 30% of 
any undistributed amounts remaining at the end of each tax year; and an additional tax 
equal to 100% of the amount remaining undistributed at the end of such year and each 
succeeding one.  Thus the court's conclusion that without reformation it would be 
possible to use some of the income for scholarships and the rest for tax without touching 
 
185 U.S. Trust Co v. Attorney General, 854 N.E. 2d 1231 (Mass. 2006). 
186 I.R.C. § 4942 (2007); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 68A, § 2 (2007) which applies as a matter of state 
law the provisions of IRC section 4942 to Massachusetts private foundations. 
187 U.S. Trust Co., 854 N.E. 2d at 1236. 
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the principal misstates the effect of its decision. It reflects a basic misunderstanding of 
the Internal Revenue Code provisions; the Massachusetts statute that applies the federal 
rules to all private foundations in the state; and the state statutes and cases adopting the 
Uniform Prudent Investor Rule, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, and liberal 
interpretations of the doctrines of cy pres and deviation. Greater exchanges of 
information between state and federal regulators may not obviate errors of this nature, but 
one hopes that at the least the regulators might gain a better understanding of the 
respective laws it is their duty to enforce.   
 
PENDING PROPOSALS FROM THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE STAFF: As 
noted above, the 2006 legislation incorporated only a portion of the more than thirty-five 
recommendations from the Finance Committee Staff. A few of these recommendations 
were included in a bill passed by the Finance Committee on June 28, 2006.188 These 
included mandating electronic filing;189 increasing funding to the IRS to combat abusive 
tax avoidance;190 clarification of the definition of a church tax inquiry;191 increased 
penalties for certain charities engaging in lobbying and election activity;192 increasing 
disclosure of certain transactions;193 and extending declaratory judgment procedures now 
available to charities to other exempt organizations.194  
 
Not included in the new and pending legislation as of October 2006 were 
recommendations that eligibility for exemption be reevaluated every five years;195 
improvements to Forms 990 and 990-PF;196 mandatory audits197 and IRS compilation of 
 
188 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MODIFICATION 
TO S. 1321 AND S. 832 (2006). 
189 See id. at 23-24. 
190 See id. at 21. 
191 See id. at 22. 
192 See id. at 55-60. 
193 See id. at 62-64. 
194 See id. at 123. 
195 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 35 at 1. 
196 See id. at 7-9. 
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uniform reporting standards;198 establishment of a certification system to assure 
compliance with a set of “best practices” monitored by the IRS and reporting by charities 
of their compliance with performance standards;199 prohibitions against payment of 
compensation to trustees and directors and limits on reimbursement for travel 
expenses;200 a requirement of a minimum  of three and a maximum of 15 directors of all 
charities, and that a majority of the directors be independent;201 and adoption of a federal 
prudent investor rule.202  
 
Among the remaining proposals of the Finance Committee Staff designed to enhance 
regulation were provisions to provide funds to the states for enforcement; permit the IRS 
to remove fiduciaries and employees if they were found to have violated the self-dealing 
rules; and grant to the Federal Tax Court equity powers to enforce the Code provisions, 
similar to the powers held by state courts.203 Those powers would include the ability to 
remove directors and trustees, require restitution, impose surcharges, issue injunctions, 
and order dissolutions.204 The Staff also proposed that co-fiduciaries and private citizens 
be empowered to bring suit in federal court to enforce the Code restrictions.205 Finally the 
Staff recommended that solicitation of charitable donations and conversion of charities to 
for-profit status be regulated by the Internal Revenue Service,206 rather than remain the 
province of the states as they presently are.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: In its 
response to the Finance Committee proposals, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector 
 
197 See id. at 9. 
198 See id.  
199 See id. at 11-14. 
200 See id. at 5-6. 
201 See id. at 13. 
202 See id. at 15. 
203 See id. at 13-16. 
204 See id. at 16. 
205 See id. at 17-18.   
206 See id. at 6-7. 
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supported tightening Code provisions affecting donor advised funds and supporting 
organizations;207 increasing the exchange of information between the IRS and state 
regulators;208 and requiring annual status reports from small organizations exempt from 
filing annual information returns.209 All of these recommendations were part of the 2006 
Pension Protection Act. The Panel also recommended mandating audits for organizations 
with annual revenues of $1 million or more and requiring public disclosure of their 
contents.210   
 
Among proposals to amend governance and administration that the Panel did not endorse 
were those that would require disclosure of performance data;211 prohibit payment of 
compensation to fiduciaries;212 limit foreign grant making;213 and enact a federal prudent 
investor rule.214 The Panel also objected to certain of the proposals designed to improve 
regulation, specifically those that would require periodic review of exempt status,215 
regulate conversions,216 provide the federal courts with equity powers,217 regulate 
charitable solicitations,218 and mandate public disclosure of Form 990-T reports of 
unrelated business income.219 Of these, only the final one requiring public disclosure of 
Form 990-T was enacted in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  
 
 
207 See PANEL, FINAL REPORT, supra note 144 at 39-48. 
208 See id. at 24. 
209 See id. at 26. 
210 See id. at 35. 
211 See id. at 37. 
212 See PANEL, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 145 at 13-15. 
213 See id. at 5-6. 
214 See id. at 16-17. 
215 See PANEL, FINAL, supra note 144 at 33-34.  
216 See supp. At 18-20. 
217 See id. at 28-29. 
218 See id. at 10-12. 
219 See id. at 26-27. 
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There is a final important recommendation, not clearly articulated in the Finance 
Committee Staff proposals, but developed in the Panel Report, that is designed to achieve 
better coordination of federal and state regulatory efforts. Section 508(e) of the Code 
conditions tax exemption for a private foundation on inclusion in its governing document 
of a provision requiring compliance with the limitations on private foundation operations 
contained in Chapter 42 and prohibits their managers from entering into any self-dealing 
transactions prohibited in that chapter.220 Instead of inclusion of the requisite language in 
articles of organization or trust documents, regulations promulgated in 1972 provide that 
the governing instrument requirement can be met if a valid state law imposes these 
obligations on all private foundations within its jurisdiction.221 By 1975 forty-eight states 
and the District of Columbia had passed such laws.222 These laws have provided state 
regulatory officials with grounds for prosecuting failures to comply with federally 
imposed rules, an unprecedented example of coordination of the two regulatory 
schemes.223  
 
Under the Panel’s proposal, a similar provision would apply to all publicly supported 
charities (the remaining universe of organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3)), 
requiring compliance with the Excess Benefit provisions in Code section 4958.224 Maine 
adopted such a provision in its 2002 act225 and a similar requirement is part of the bill 
submitted by the Massachusetts attorney general in 2004 to improve state regulation.226 
However, it is unlikely that other states will follow suit without impetus from Congress, 
as was the case in the 70s. Furthermore, there are no reported instances in which a state 
has taken legal action against a private foundation solely on the grounds of failure to 
comply with these state provisions. This does not mean that the prohibitions have not 
 
220 I.R.C. §508(e) (West 2006). 
221 Treas. Reg. §1.508-3(d) (as amended in 1980). 
222 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2 at 267.  
223 See id. 
224 See PANEL, FINAL, supra note 144 at 24-25.  
225 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.13-B §718 (2003). 
226 See H.B. 4347, 184th Gen. Court (Mass. 2005). 
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served as a deterrent, nor that threat of state litigation has not resulted in corrections. At 
best, it provides one more weapon for regulators and contributes to uniformity among the 
states.  
 
Situs of Federal Regulation: A New Agency and Other Proposals 
 
 The role of the Internal Revenue Service as regulator of tax exempt entities has long 
been subject to question by commentators, government officials and practitioners. 
Proposals to create a new agency to regulate charities, some modeled on the English 
Charity Commissioners, some on the Securities and Exchange Commission or the quasi-
governmental bodies which operate in conjunction with it have been considered.227 In the 
mid 1970s the Filer Commission Report contained proposals for alternative regulatory 
schemes, but they received little attention in succeeding years.228 Some commentators 
argue that improvements in IRS administration of the tax exemption provisions warrant 
continuing its role, although they uniformly argue that funding for its operations has been 
inadequate.229 Most recently, Marcus Owens, former director of the Exempt Organization 
Division of the IRS, has suggested moving enforcement to a new agency modeled on the 
National Association of Securities Dealers.230 This would be a quasi-public agency, 
financed in part by credits against the excise tax on private foundations or a licensing fee, 
operating in conjunction with the Internal Revenue Service as the NASD does, with the 
new body granting exemptions and receiving and reviewing annual reports.231      Other 
proposals, old and new, have focused on increasing cooperation between federal and state 
regulators, in particular by permitting the Service to refrain from imposing sanctions if 
 
227 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2 at 462-63. 
228 See id. at 461-66. 
229 See, e.g., Panel on the Nonprofit Sector Work Group, #14: Funding for Federal and State Enforcement 
at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/workgrouprecs/Initial14.pdf (Jan. 26, 2005); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 
2 at 471. 
230 See Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach (Dec. 11, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
231 See id. at 9-14. 
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the state attorney general has taken corrective action.232 There is precedent for this in 
section 507, under which the Service may abate the confiscatory tax that is imposed on 
private foundations under certain extreme circumstances if corrective action has been 
taken under state law to assure that the assets of the foundation have been preserved for 
charitable purposes under order of a state court.233
                                                                                                                                                                              
Extending the application of an abatement power to violations of the Code would provide 
the Service and the federal courts with the broader range of equity powers held by the 
state courts, affording remedies directly designed to preserve charitable funds. It must be 
recognized however, that there is a general lack of interest in the states in suggestions of 
this nature, undoubtedly due to budget constraints. To overcome the states’ failure to act, 
it has been suggested that Congress could provide subsidies to those states that adopt the 
federal requirements for administration of charities and establish enforcement programs 
that conform to federal rules. There is precedent for such subsidies in the administration 
of social security and unemployment benefit provisions, but little impetus in Congress to 
increase funding for enforcement of nonprofits, whether by the IRS or the states. 
 
FINANCE COMMITTEE MINORITY STAFF REPORT ON ABRAMOFF'S USE OF 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In September 2005 the Minority Staff of the Senate Finance Committee issued a report 
summarizing findings from an investigation conducted during 2005 of the use by a 
lobbyist, Jack Abramoff, of charities to further his and his clients’ personal ends.234 The 
report contained detailed summaries of the relationship of five tax exempt charities to Mr. 
Abramoff235 and a set of recommendations for amendments to the Internal Revenue Code 
suggested for consideration by the Majority Staff and the Members of the Finance 
 
232 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2 at 460.   
233 See I.R.C. §507(g) (West 2006). 
234 See Comm. Print 109-68, supra note 138. 
235 See id. at 9-51. 
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Committee.236 Among the proposals was one to expand the definition of lobbying to 
include payment of travel, meals, and similar expenses of a government official by a 
section 501(3)(3) organization if a registered lobbyist is a disqualified person or a 
substantial contributor to the charity.237 A second would further expand the definition of 
lobbying activity to cover lobbying of the Executive branch, including lobbying with 
respect to administrative agencies and federal appointments.238 With changes in the 
composition of the majority and minority committees in Congress as a result of the 
November 2006 elections, it was uncertain as of the end of the year what the likelihood 
of Congressional attention to these proposals would be in 2007 and thereafter.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The length of this summary demonstrates an unprecedented degree of current interest in 
charity law. Congress has periodically focused on charities since the early years of the 
20th century and, following extensive Congressional investigations in 1950 and 1969, 
substantially expanded the scope of the Code provisions and the sanctions for violations. 
Public disclosure of financial and other data was increasingly relied on to supplement 
direct enforcement. Interest in the states has been far less intense. As noted, aside from 
the adoption of registration and reporting requirements and establishment of charity 
bureaus in ten states in the 1960s and 1970s (New Hampshire having enacted the first 
such statute in the 1940s), no similar programs have been instituted, and regulation in the 
vast majority of jurisdictions has fallen by default to the Internal Revenue Service.  
 
Many of the new initiatives to change state law described herein have been influenced by 
the scandals that led to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It is open to question whether 
these new laws will in fact improve the administration of nonprofit organizations, 
although it is too soon to tell. Reliance on mandatory audits appears to be universally 
accepted as a necessary minimum requirement. However, there is no evidence that there 
 
236 See id. at 52-55. 
237 See id. at 54. 
238 See id.  
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is less wrongdoing by charities in Massachusetts than in other states, despite the fact that 
for thirty years audits have been required in Massachusetts for all charities with gross 
receipts of $500,000 or more, other than religious organizations.239  
 
What is notable about the enacted and proposed changes in substantive state laws is that 
they have greatly restricted the influence of donors and their heirs in cases involving a 
change of purposes necessitated by changed circumstances. Much has been written about 
the adverse effect of the “Dead Hand” and in the past that doctrine has certainly restricted 
efforts to reform obsolete charitable purposes. Today that is no longer the case. However, 
as the influence of donors has greatly diminished in cases involving a change of 
purposes, the opposite has occurred in regard to enforcement. Here the trend in statutes 
and cases has been to greatly expand the rights of donors to bring suit to enforce the 
terms of their gifts in state courts under the Uniform Trust Code and as proposed by the 
Finance Committee staff for the federal courts. Proponents of expanding standing do 
express concern as to whether it will limit the willingness of individuals to serve as 
directors and trustees – the same rationale that is put forth by proponents of limiting 
liability of fiduciaries and providing them with immunity shields. The rationale for the 
change is usually that it is necessary because the states will not act and some enforcement 
mechanism is necessary to correct abuses.  
 
At the federal level, the adoption of intermediate sanctions for violation of the excess 
benefit transaction provisions was a major turning point in federal regulation.  Congress 
recognized, as it had failed to in 1969, that wrongdoing was not confined to private 
foundations and that the public could not be relied on to police public charities by 
withholding contributions to those whose administrative costs were excessive or who had 
dubious records.  
 
The more recent proposals from the Finance Committee Staff would fundamentally 
change the nature of federal regulation, vastly extending the power of the Service to 
 
239 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §8F (2006). 
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control the manner in which charities are administered. This is best exemplified in the 
proposals to condition tax exemption on compliance with a set of “best practices” 
through a certification system, adopt a federal prudent investment rule, grant the IRS 
power to remove fiduciaries, and give the federal courts equity powers to effect 
corrections. It is unlikely that such far reaching changes will become law in the 
immediate future. But they have been a valuable impetus to sector-wide consideration of 
the optimum methods for policing charities and as such a most valuable contribution. The 
process by which they are being considered is unprecedented and can only result in wiser 
consideration of the manner in which we can achieve greater accountability for the 
nonprofit sector.  
    **************** 
In considering the principles that should underlie any efforts to improve governance and 
accountability in the nonprofit sector, one must take into account the disparate nature of 
our current regulatory schemes. Federal and state laws may coincide, but rarely have they 
been devised in concert and rarely have enforcement efforts of the two governmental 
entities been coordinated in any meaningful way. The provisions in the 2006 Pension 
Protection Act permitting more meaningful exchange of information between federal and 
state regulators may lead to a change. It cannot obliterate the fact that the purposes of the 
two enforcement regimes are at base diverse – the purpose of state rules and state 
regulation is to preserve charitable funds for the continuing benefit of society as its needs 
evolve, while the purpose of the federal rules is to preserve the integrity of the tax 
system.  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the tax focus was foremost in the eyes of federal regulators. 
However, this view changed gradually in the 1960s, particularly after passage of the 1969 
Tax Reform Act, which added intermediate sanctions to the Code for violation of the 
private foundation rules. The change continued with subsequent restructuring of the IRS 
in response to the growth of the nonprofit sector, particularly in the number and size of 
pension plans under their jurisdiction following enactment of ERISA in 1974. This 
growth forced the Treasury Department and the Service to recognize that enforcement of 
laws governing tax exempt entities required vastly different tools and personnel than that 
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needed for enforcement of laws designed to assure collection of taxes from individuals 
and business entities. The result has been vast improvement in federal regulation, but a 
failure to address the dichotomy. The rationale for proposals to create a new federal 
agency to regulate charities is that the IRS can never be the appropriate vehicle for 
enforcing laws that do not involve tax collection.  
 
Regardless of the situs of federal regulation, there remains the basic question of what if 
any regulatory role should be retained by the states. One of the justifications for retaining 
state power is the proximity of state attorneys general and state courts to the entities 
subject to regulation. This is viewed as permitting more appropriate applications of the 
law, particularly in cases involving cy pres and deviation. Another advantage is the 
breadth of sanctions available in state courts in the exercise of their equity powers, 
sanctions that are, at all times, aimed at preserving charitable assets rather than imposing 
taxes that diminish charitable assets.  Proposals to confer equity powers on the Tax Court 
signify that this may no longer be considered a valid argument for preserving a state role. 
The Finance Committee Staff proposals for federal regulation of conversions and 
solicitation confront us with the same questions. 
 
As a society, we have encouraged the creation and growth of nonprofit charitable 
organizations on the grounds that they provide unique benefits to the general public 
different in nature and purpose from those provided by government or the private sector. 
In encouraging the growth of the nonprofit sector, we have afforded great leeway to 
individuals to determine the purposes to which their gifts will be applied and the manner 
in which these purposes will be accomplished. We have said to charitable fiduciaries that 
if you act in furtherance of any one or more of a broad range of purposes sanctioned in 
the law by virtue of their being considered as beneficial to society; if you do not benefit 
personally at the expense of the charity; and if you are not reckless in the administration 
of its assets, we will not attempt to second guess the methods you choose to accomplish 
those purposes nor apply sanctions, even if you do so in ways that may be considered by 
government or the private sector as inefficient or inappropriate.    
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Current reform efforts described herein are directed at base in assuring the integrity of the 
sector. That is what we mean when we call for greater accountability. As the recitation of 
the numerous initiatives demonstrates, the tension is always between granting more 
freedom to fiduciaries to determine how best to frame and then carry out the mission of 
the organization they are entrusted to manage (e.g. immunity from liability), and limiting 
that freedom by prescribing the forms in which they can be organized and the manner in 
which they will operate (e.g. limiting the size of boards and mandating governance 
structures).    
 
It is generally accepted that the strength of the nonprofit sector is attributable in large part 
to the freedom afforded to charities and their creators.  But critics also point to this lack 
of regulation as the cause of excesses that they believe can best be curtailed by limiting 
the freedom of choice or demanding compliance with standards of efficiency or 
propriety. Others argue that there is insufficient connection between the benefits given to 
charities and the value they give back to the public. They would require a more 
immediate demonstration of public benefit from funds for which tax deductions and 
exemptions are granted – whether through expanding the pay out requirement now 
imposed on foundations to endowment funds held by publicly supported charities, or by 
limiting the life of charities. Still others would require charities to demonstrate 
compliance with specific standards that will permit measurement of the extent of their 
contribution to society. 
 
If one believes that rigorous monitoring of charitable performance is needed, then one 
must consider who can best do the monitoring. Some commentators argue that only 
government can carry out this function. Others believe it can be accomplished by 
requiring charities to justify their status through expanded public disclosure requirements. 
Expansion of self-regulation is also under study. If government is doing the monitoring, it 
can be afforded sanctions to compel compliance. If it is the public, withholding 
contributions and fees will be effective sanctions for charities that rely on contributions 
from the public or from receipts for services they provide for funding. It will not be so for 
foundations and public charities with endowments that make then virtually self-sufficient 
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or for those that rely solely on receipts for services. For these self-regulation, with all its 
limitations, may be the only answer. Underlying all analyses must be consideration of the 
degree to which measure of this sort will change the basic nature of the sector; whether 
restricting its freedom will curtail its ability to be innovative, to respond promptly to 
unforeseen needs and to operate without some of the bureaucratic constraints that are a 
concomitant of governmental activity. This is undoubtedly the greatest challenge that 
must be faced by those who want to preserve the sector. 
 
52 
